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Abstract	
This	 paper	 investigates	 the	 implementation	 of	 Article	 36	 of	 the	 Vienna	 Convention	 on	
Consular	Relations	in	Australia,	New	Zealand	and	the	United	States	(US)	by	using	a	Southern	
approach	to	examining	law.	We	describe	the	incorporation	of	Article	36	from	a	defendant‐
centred	perspective	under	Australian	and	New	Zealand	laws	governing	police	procedure,	and	
the	 commensurate	 jurisdictional	 tensions	 it	has	 generated	 in	 the	US.	We	 then	empirically	
analyse	16	non‐capital	US	cases	to	identify	the	type	of	offence,	the	nationality	and	perceived	
English‐speaking	competency	of	the	foreign	suspect,	and	the	point	at	which	the	alleged	Article	
36	violation	 is	 canvassed	 in	 legal	 arguments.	 This	 analysis	 highlights	 the	 importance	of	 a	
defendant‐centred	Southern	criminology	of	law	in	critically	assessing	the	implementation	of	
international	legal	requirements	into	domestic	criminal	justice	practice.	
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Introduction	
Southern	criminology’s	emphasis	on	‘power	relations	embedded	in	the	hierarchical	production	
of	criminological	knowledge’	(Carrington,	Hogg	and	Sozzo	2016:	2)	is	well‐suited	to	the	critical	
examination	 of	 international	 and	 national	 responses	 to	 alleged	 crimes	 by	 foreign	 nationals.	
Broader	crimmigration	strategies	(Bosworth	and	Kaufman	2011)	reflect	contemporary	forms	of	
global	legal	pluralism	(Berman	2012),	consisting	of	 ‘autonomous	…	international	treaty	norms	
and	many	autonomous	sets	of	domestic	criminal	norms	with	quite	distinctive	points	of	authority’	
(Boister	2015:	14)	that	often	lack	clear	guidance	or	accountability	for	law‐enforcement	decision‐
making	(Bowling	and	Sheptycki	2015).	Foreign	nationals	in	pre‐trial	or	post‐conviction	custody	
often	bear	the	brunt	of	highly	questionable	domestic	crimmigration	policies	that	are	regulated	in	
distinct	 ways	 at	 varying	 legal	 scales	 (Dorsett	 and	 McVeigh	 2012;	 Valverde	 2015)	 under	 a	
combination	of	international	crime	control	and	human	rights	treaties	(Andreas	and	Nadelmann	
2006).	
	
Consular	notification	is	an	increasingly	significant	yet	under‐researched	branch	of	diplomatic	law	
that	 directly	 shapes	 domestic	 police	 procedure.	 Statistics	 on	 the	 number	 of	 foreign	 nationals	
investigated,	charged	with,	convicted	of,	imprisoned	for,	or	victimised	by	crime	are	rare	(Klein	
2011;	c.f.	Venditto	and	Mouzos	2006).	However,	in	Australia	each	year,	up	to	ten	million	tourists	
(Tourism	Australia	2017)	and	one	million	registered	foreign	workers	(Australian	Government,	
Department	of	Home	Affairs	2017)	could	be	eligible	for	assistance	from	119	foreign	consulates	
located	throughout	the	country	(Department	of	Foreign	Affairs	and	Trade	n.d.).	An	average	of	four	
daily	requests	for	some	form	of	consular	assistance	is	made	by	Australian	sole	or	dual	citizens	
touring,	working	or	residing	abroad	temporarily	or	permanently	(Warren	and	Palmer	2015:	5‐
6).	Most	involve	advice	on	how	to	deal	with	a	lapsed	visa	or	passport.	However,	consular	offices	
also	provide	assistance	for	accusations	of	serious	criminal	offending	and	victimisation	affecting	
their	nationals,	as	well	as	more	complex	claims	for	diplomatic	or	political	asylum	and	related	legal	
immunities	(Lavander	2014;	Lee	and	Quigley	2008;	Warren	and	Palmer	2015;	Wojcik	2013).	This	
defendant‐centred	(Gless	2015)	emphasis	can	avert	the	possibility	‘a	local	problem’	will	evolve	
into	a	more	serious	 ‘international	one’	(Loader	and	Percy	2012:	218)	with	bi‐	or	multi‐lateral	
political	and	economic	implications.		
	
This	paper	examines	the	distinct	methods	of	incorporating	Article	36	of	the	Vienna	Convention	
on	Consular	Relations	(VCCR	1963:2005)	into	Australian,	New	Zealand	and	United	States	(US)	
law,	while	developing	a	defendant‐centred	Southern	criminology	of	 law.	First,	we	explain	our	
Southern	approach	to	law	(Warren	and	Palmer	2018)	and	its	applicability	to	key	elements	of	the	
Article	 36	 provisions.	 Second,	 we	 explain	 Australian	 and	 New	 Zealand	 legislation	 governing	
consular	notification,	and	describe	available	judicial	rulings	examining	its	enforcement.	Third,	we	
summarise	US	scholarly	and	judicial	arguments	that	‘bracket’	(Blomley	2014)	Article	36	within	a	
contested	 jurisdictional	 ‘dialogue’	 between	 the	 International	 Court	 of	 Justice	 (ICJ),	 the	 US	
Supreme	Court,	and	state	criminal	trial	and	appeal	courts	(Berman	2012;	Rogoff	2006).	We	then	
outline	the	results	of	a	preliminary	empirical	investigation	into	how	salient	facts	about	the	alleged	
crime,	the	foreign	suspect’s	background,	and	the	nature	of	the	police	encounter	are	classified	in	a	
sample	of	16	non‐capital	cases	that	denied	the	foreign	national’s	post‐conviction	arguments.	We	
conclude	 by	 highlighting	 the	 importance	 of	 a	 defendant‐centred	 Southern	 criminology	 of	 law	
when	 critically	 examining	 the	 incorporation	 of	 international	 law	 into	 domestic	 criminal	
procedure.		
	
Southern	criminology,	law	and	Article	36	of	the	VCCR	
The	VCCR	 is	an	example	of	global	consensus‐building	aimed	at	protecting	 foreign	nationals	 in	
unfamiliar	criminal	justice	systems	(Lee	and	Quigley	2008).	However,	domestic	legislatures	and	
courts	ultimately	determine	whether	any	international	legal	issue	is	‘bracketed’	as	a	procedural	
or	 jurisdictional	 requirement	 (Dorsett	 and	McVeigh	 2012;	 Valverde	 2015),	 or	 whether	 these	
issues	remain	completely	excluded	and	‘outside	of	law’	(Blomley	2014:	136).	By	interpreting	key	
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facts	 and	 relevant	 legal	 principles	 ‘more	 or	 less	 independently	 of	 their	 surrounding	 context’,	
domestic	 institutions	 attempt	 to	 ‘stabilise	 and	 fix	 a	 boundary’	 for	 the	 permissible	 scope	 of	
international	legal	protection	within	domestic	law	(Blomley	2014:	135).	A	Southern	criminology	
of	 law	 interrogates	 the	potentially	 selective,	biased,	prejudicial	 or	 counterintuitive	 impacts	of	
these	processes	on	crime	suspects,	law	enforcement	personnel	and	others	immediately	affected	
by	their	implementation	(Warren	and	Palmer	2018).		
	
Article	36	is	considered	a	self‐executing	requirement	that	applies	automatically	on	ratification	
(Howell	 2013)	 and	 confers	 specific	 rights	 on	 consular	 officials	 vis‐á‐vis	 each	 ratifying	 nation	
(Buys,	Pollock	and	Pellicer	2011).	It	is	commonly	viewed	as	placing	a	positive	obligation	on	police	
to	 ensure	 any	 foreign	 national	 in	 custody	 is	 informed	 of	 their	 right	 to	 consular	 assistance	
(Stransky	2007:	54).	Article	36	stipulates	the	 ‘receiving	state’	must,	 ‘without	delay’,	notify	‘the	
consular	post	of	the	sending	state’	when	one	of	its	nationals	is	‘arrested	or	committed	to	prison	
or	 to	 custody	 pending	 trial	 or	 is	 detained	 in	 any	 other	 manner’	 (VCCR	 1963:	 2005).	 Most	
supplementary	 bi‐	 and	 multi‐lateral	 treaties	 specify	 that	 notification	 must	 occur	 within	 a	
maximum	number	of	days	or	hours	(Buys,	Pollock	and	Pellicer	2011:	464‐466;	Lee	and	Quigley	
2008).	 Foreign	 suspects	 can	 receive	 private	 consular	 visits	 and	 request	 help	 to	 obtain	
independent	legal	representation	or	communicate	with	family	and	friends	(Art	36.1	(a)	and	(c)	
VCCR	1963:	2005),	but	are	only	obliged	to	accept	assistance	in	a	small	number	of	jurisdictions.		
	
In	Australia	and	New	Zealand,	Article	36	supplements	common	law	‘guidelines	for	the	conduct	of	
police	 officers	when	 interrogating	 Aboriginal	 persons	 and	…	migrants’	 in	 the	 presence	 of	 an	
interpreter	or	‘prisoner’s	friend’	(R	v	Anunga	and	Others;	R	v	Wheeler	1976:	413‐415).	When,	
where	and	how	these	rights	are	communicated	and	enforced	is	of	‘vital	importance’	(New	Zealand	
Law	Commission	1994:	4)	 in	averting	potential	misunderstandings	 flowing	 from	the	 ‘extreme	
imbalance	of	power’	facing	Indigenous	people	(Douglas	1998:	29)	and	foreign	nationals	in	police	
custody.	These	spatial	and	temporal	issues	are	also	of	growing	importance	in	critical	socio‐legal	
inquiry	 (Blomley	 2014;	 Valverde	 2015),	 and	 are	 intentionally	 or	 inadvertently	 magnified	 by	
broader	social	attitudes	towards	racial	difference	or	crimmigration.		
	
The	US	jurisdictional	focus	in	this	article	examines	whether	‘decisions	of	international	tribunals	
may	 intrude	 into	 the	normal	operation	of	…	domestic	 legal	 systems’	 (Rogoff	 2006:	408).	This	
emphasis	turns	on	macro	questions	of	international	political	comity	(Stransky	2007;	Warren	and	
Palmer	2015:	292),	which	are	complicated	when	federal	authorities	ratify	international	treaties,	
yet	 most	 criminal	 offences	 are	 investigated	 and	 prosecuted	 by	 state	 or	 provincial	 agencies	
(Garland	2013;	Howell	2013:	1354;	 James	and	Warren	2010).	Although	potentially	having	the	
same	legal	effects	when	a	foreign	national	 is	denied	consular	assistance,	our	analysis	suggests	
procedural	or	jurisdictional	bracketing	can	have	significant	implications	on	ensuring	formal	legal	
accountability	for	routine	police	practice.		
	
Consular	notification	in	Australia	and	New	Zealand		
This	section	reveals	slight	variations	in	the	incorporation	of	the	VCCR	after	Australia	ratified	this	
Convention	on	12	February	1973	and	New	Zealand	on	10	September	1974	(United	Nations	Treaty	
Collection	2016).	Most	Australian	jurisdictions	expressly	incorporate	consular	notification	into	
modified	cautioning	requirements	aimed	at	protecting	children	and	young	people,	Aboriginal	and	
Torres	 Strait	 Islanders,	 persons	 from	 culturally	 and	 linguistically	 diverse	 backgrounds,	 and	
people	with	mental,	developmental,	visual	or	other	impairments	from	unfair	or	abusive	police	
tactics	(Bartels	2011:	2).	In	New	Zealand	and	Western	Australia,	consular	notification	is	implied	
by	provisions	allowing	all	suspects	the	right	to	‘an	interpreter	or	other	qualified	person’	(ss.	10;	
137‐138	Criminal	Investigation	Act	2006	(WA))	or	‘legal	representation	and	habeas	corpus	review	
of	the	legality	of	detention’	(ss.	22‐25	Bill	of	Rights	Act	1990	(NZ)).	These	provisions	serve	the	
same	function	as	Australian	federal	laws	obliging	police	to	inform	foreign	suspects	of	the	right	to	
consular	notification	and	assistance	 (s.	23P	Crimes	Act	1914	(Cth);	Quigley,	Aceves	and	Shank	
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2010:	162‐163),	which	coexists	with	the	right	to	contact	a	friend,	relative,	legal	practitioner	or	
interpreter,	and	a	general	requirement	to	be	 ‘treated	with	humanity	and	…	respect	for	human	
dignity’	while	in	custody	(ss.	23G,	23N	and	23Q	Crimes	Act	1914	(Cth);	Queensland	Police	2016:	
30).	In	three	Australian	states,	Article	36	is	incorporated	into	similar	cautioning	provisions	(see	
s.	 464F	Crimes	Act	1958	 (Vic);	 s.	 124	Law	Enforcement	 (Powers	and	Responsibilities)	Act	2002	
(NSW);	s.	434	Police	Powers	and	Responsibilities	Act	2000	(Qld))	that	oblige	police	to	communicate	
these	‘rights’	and	‘help’	foreign	suspects	who	wish	to	‘speak	with	a	consular	official	…	in	private’	
(New	South	Wales	Police	Force	n.d.:	1).		
	
Police	 guidelines	 (Bartels	 2011)	 and	 operational	 discretion	 can	 temper	 these	 communicative	
obligations	 if	 it	 appears	 delays	 in	 providing	 assistance	 will	 contribute	 to	 the	 destruction	 of	
evidence,	witness	tampering,	or	threats	to	public	safety	(s.	23L	Crimes	Act	1914	(Cth)).	In	New	
South	Wales,	the	written	caution	informs	suspects	that	‘investigating	police	do	not	have	to	wait	
for	more	than	2	hours’	for	the	consular	official	to	arrive	before	commencing	an	interview	(New	
South	Wales	 Police	 Force	 n.d.:	 1).	 Federal	 provisions	 allowing	 third‐party	 communication	 by	
‘telephone,	telex,	fax	or	other	electronic	means’	potentially	offset	such	time	delays	(s.	3ZQC(3)(B)	
Crimes	Act	1914	(Cth)).		
	
Incriminating	evidence,	including	confessions	proffered	when	no	consular	officer,	translator	or	
legal	 representative	 is	 present,	 can	be	 excluded	 at	 trial	 if	 deemed	 involuntarily,	 unreliable	 or	
obtained	via	deliberate	or	systematic	police	misconduct	(R	v	Anunga	and	others;	R	v	Wheeler	and	
others	(1976)	11	ALR	412).	A	retrial	can	also	be	ordered	if	such	evidence	contributed	significantly	
to	 a	 wrongful	 conviction	 (R	 v	 Swaffield;	 Pavic	 v	 R	 [1998]	 192	 CLR	 159).	 However,	 recent	
legislative	reforms	have	incrementally	eroded	common	law	admissibility	standards	(Gray	2013),	
with	 five	 leading	Australian	rulings	examining	 the	consular	notification	provisions	supporting	
this	trend.		
	
Between	 1997	 and	 2001,	 four	 federal	 drug	 trafficking	 cases	 considered	 the	 admissibility	 of	
evidence	 obtained	 after	 police	 ignored	 a	 foreign	 suspect’s	 request	 for	 third‐party	 assistance	
(Tang	Seng	Kiah	v	R	 [2001]	NTCCA	1)	or	 failed	 to	 issue	 the	caution	due	 to	concerns	over	 the	
possible	destruction	of	physical	evidence	(R	v	Kok	Cheng	Tan	[2001]	WASC	275).	Three	resulted	
in	retrials	due	to	the	prejudicial	 impact	of	 the	evidence,	with	one	successful	claim	 involving	a	
foreign	suspect	who	received	no	caution,	knew	little	about	Australian	criminal	procedure,	and	
experienced	‘argumentative,	aggressive	and	oppressive’	questioning	(R	v	Su	[1997]	1	VR	1	para	
58;	Quigley,	Aceves	and	Shank	2010:	165‐168).	A	fourth	case	admitted	incriminating	statements	
based	 on	 video	 evidence	 suggesting	 the	 foreign	 national	 understood	 the	 caution	 and	 was	
interviewed	 voluntarily,	 despite	 some	 confusion	 over	 whether	 he	 felt	 he	 should	 contact	 his	
consulate,	his	wife,	 legal	counsel,	or	all	three	(Foo	v	The	Queen	[2001]	NTCCA	2	paras	38‐45).	
These	cases	indicate	Australian	courts	bracket	consular	notification	as	a	positive	obligation	on	
police	 to	 provide	 foreign	 nationals	 an	 ‘opportunity’	 to	 ‘seek	 [formal]	 advice	 and	 assistance’,	
communicate	with	 ‘relatives	 and	 friends	…	 in	 his	 or	 her	 native	 language’,	 and	 ‘enter	 into	 the	
interview’	without	‘improper	pressure’	(Tang	Seng	Kiah	v	R	[2001]	NTCCA	1	para	66).	This	also	
has	important	reciprocal	consequences	for	any	‘Australian	national	held	in	custody	in	a	foreign	
non‐English	speaking	country	without	access	to	an	Australian	consular	office’	(Tang	Seng	Kiah	v	
R	[2001]	NTCCA	1	paras	49	and	66).		
	
Only	one	reported	case	has	examined	these	requirements	since	2001.	Ade	Sutiawan	Bin	Sulaeman	
v	 R	 ([2013]	 NSWCCA	 283)	 involved	 an	 interview	 conducted	 by	 a	 Royal	 Australian	 Navy	
Lieutenant	 on	 board	 a	 Suspected	 Irregular	 Entry	 Vessel	 (SIEV)	 that	 was	 attempting	 to	 enter	
Australian	territorial	waters	near	Christmas	Island.	The	questions	were	contained	on	a	series	of	
translation	cards	authorised	by	the	Australian	Fisheries	Management	Authority	(AFMA),	and	an	
Indonesian	crewmember	made	several	non‐verbal	gestures	indicating	he	‘understood	meaning	
and	effect	of	 the	caution’	(Ade	Sutiawan	Bin	Sulaeman	v	R	 [2013]	NSWCCA	283	para	74)	and	
believed	57	Middle	Eastern	passengers	on	board	were	irregular	migrants	destined	for	Australia.	
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No	 consular	 official,	 interpreter	 or	 legal	 representative	 was	 on	 board	 the	 SIEV.	 These	
communications	were	ruled	admissible	as	the	affirmative	gestures	showed	a	clear	‘understanding	
of	the	questions	on	the	AFMA	cards	and	the	responses	he	gave’	(Ade	Sutiawan	Bin	Sulaeman	v	R	
[2013]	NSWCCA	283	para	142),	with	the	protections	under	s.23P	of	the	Crimes	Act	1914	(Cth)	
justifiably	 modified	 in	 2010	 to	 assist	 such	 offshore	 investigations	 into	 aggravated	 people	
smuggling	offences	(see	Warren	and	Palmer	2015:	31‐35;	38‐39).		
	
This	 outcome	 is	 a	 significant	 departure	 from	R	 v	 Kok	 Cheng	 Tan	 ([2001]	WASC	 275),	which	
challenged	 the	 admissibility	of	physical	 evidence	and	 incriminating	 statements	obtained	after	
police	searched	a	hotel	room	pending	issuance	of	a	telephone	warrant.	Illicit	drugs	and	a	mobile	
phone	were	admissible	because	police	justifiably	feared	their	destruction	pending	notification	of	
the	warrant.	However,	incriminating	statements	made	by	one	foreign	suspect	were	excluded,	as	
the	decision	to	commence	the	interview	in	the	absence	of	an	interpreter	and	without	the	caution	
being	administered	involved	a	‘deliberate	disregard	of	the	applicant’s	statutory	rights’	given	his	
evident	‘difficulties	in	understanding	English’,	and	the	lack	of	‘urgency	or	risk	to	the	evidential	
material’	 (R	 v	 Kok	 Cheng	 Tan	 [2001]	 WASC	 275	 paras	 58‐59).	 This	 more	 stringent	 view	 of	
‘urgency’	can	be	linked	to	broader	crimmigration	debates	to	explain	the	contrary	outcome	in	Ade	
Sutiawan	Bin	Sulaeman	v	R	([2013]	NSWCCA	283).	
	
Despite	 recommendations	 for	 a	 specific	 consular	 notification	 provision	 (New	 Zealand	 Law	
Commission	1994),	 the	Bill	of	Rights	Act	1990	(NZ)	contains	a	general	 third‐party	notification	
requirement	 available	 to	 all	 suspects	 in	 police	 custody.	 While	 some	 jurisdictions	 specifically	
exempt	road	traffic	offences	from	consular	notification	(s.	464F	Crimes	Act	1958	(Vic)),	the	only	
publicly	available	New	Zealand	case	examined	the	nature	of	‘detention’	and	offence	seriousness	
contemplated	by	Articles	11	and	36	of	the	VCCR	when	deciding	the	admissibility	of	a	breathalyser	
reading	from	a	Chinese	national	informed	of	his	right	to	obtain	legal	assistance,	but	not	consular	
assistance,	at	a	routine	traffic	stop	(Bin	Zhang	v	Police	[2009]	NZAR	217;	Dunworth	2011).	The	
Wellington	High	Court	ruled	the	VCCR	contemplated	‘ongoing	support	of	the	foreign	national	in	
the	prosecution	of	criminal	charges’,	rather	than	an	unqualified	right	to	‘on	the	spot	legal	advice	
from	the	consular	post’	 (Bin	Zhang	v	Police	 [2009]	NZAR	217	para	45).	Whereas	 the	 ‘right	 to	
counsel’	 can	 provide	 meaningful	 assistance	 during	 ‘transitory’	 forms	 of	 ‘detention’,	 such	 as	
‘evidential	 breath	 testing’,	 ‘the	 foreign	 national	 cannot	 expect	 to	 obtain	 legal	 advice	 from	 the	
consular	post’	(Bin	Zhang	v	Police	[2009]	NZAR	217	para	46).	As	the	next	section	demonstrates,	
US	jurisdictional	debates	on	consular	notification	make	only	speculative	references	to	the	quality	
of	assistance	in	the	specific	contexts	of	police	detention.	
	
Article	36	and	US	legal	bracketing	
Until	 Article	 36	 is	 incorporated	 into	 federal	 or	 state	 policing	 legislation,	 convicted	 foreign	
nationals	 must	 prove	 a	 lack	 of	 consular	 assistance	 caused	 ‘actual	 prejudice’	 during	 an	
investigation	or	 trial	 (Broughton	2012:	206).	After	successive	requests	by	Paraguay,	Germany	
and	Mexico	pending	the	execution	of	their	nationals	for	capital	offences,	the	ICJ	stipulated	Article	
36	should	operate	‘in	parallel	with	the	reading	of	the	“Miranda	rights”’	and,	if	this	requirement	is	
contravened,	 state	 and	 federal	 law	 should	 offer	 appropriate	 opportunities	 for	 ‘review	 and	
reconsideration	of	the	conviction	and	sentence’	(Mexico	v	United	States	of	America	2004:	69;	73;	
Howell	2013;	Shiek	2006;	Stransky	2007).	However,	Garcia	v	Texas	(2011)	indicates	the	Supreme	
Court’s	jurisdictional	emphasis	does	not	attempt	to	broker	middle	ground	between	the	ICJ	and	
state	courts	regarding	the	acceptable	scope	of	Article	36	(Berman	2012:	307‐318).	
	
Garcia	was	a	Mexican	national	convicted	of	the	rape	and	murder	of	a	16‐year‐old	girl	in	Texas.	He	
had	 lived	 in	 the	 US	 since	 childhood	 and	 first	 became	 aware	 of	 the	 consular	 notification	
requirement	when	 talking	with	 another	 death	 row	 inmate	 (Moss	2012).	His	 application	 for	 a	
temporary	stay	of	execution	was	denied	by	a	5‐4	Supreme	Court	majority,	which	found	no	clear	
evidence	 his	 conviction	 ‘was	 prejudiced	 by	 the	 Vienna	 Convention	 violation’,	 his	 remaining	
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appeals	had	no	‘prospect	of	success’,	and	proposed	federal	 laws	incorporating	Article	36	were	
mere	‘hypothetical	legislation’	with	no	legal	implications	(Garcia	v	Texas	(2011)	131	S	Ct	2866:	
2868).	These	factors	characterise	the	broader	jurisdictional	tension	between	the	ICJ	and	the	US	
Supreme	Court	that	brackets	out	consideration	of	the	experiential	contexts	of	foreign	nationals’	
encounters	with	police	and	justice	officials,	and	ultimately	preserves	state	autonomy	over	their	
regulation	(Howell	2013;	Mallory	2016).		
	
Before	and	since	Garcia,	US	debates	have	focused	almost	exclusively	on	the	impact	of	Article	36	
in	capital	cases	immediately	pending	a	foreign	national’s	execution	(Moss	2012;	Stransky	2007),	
while	a	small	number	of	states	incorporate	consular	notification	into	police	procedure	with	no	
legal	consequences	for	non‐compliance	(Howell	2013).	Below,	we	document	16	non‐capital	cases	
involving	alleged	Article	36	violations	dating	from	1	January	2010	to	the	Garcia	ruling	on	7	July	
2011.	Our	concern	is	to	identify	how	the	legal	impact	of	the	types	of	crime	and	contexts	of	police	
or	pre‐trial	custody	are	bracketed	under	the	US	jurisdictional	approach,	and	its	comparability	to	
the	Australian	and	New	Zealand	procedural	emphasis.		
	
US	non‐capital	Article	36	claims,	January	2010‐July	2011	
Table	1	summarises	the	charges,	sentences	and	facts	in	six	cases	(37.5%	of	the	16)	reviewing	non‐
capital	homicide	convictions.		
	
Table	1:	US	homicide	cases	raising	Article	36,	January	2010‐July	2011	
Case,	date	and	
jurisdiction	
	
Offences	 Sentence	 Relevant	facts	
State	of	New	Jersey	v	
Lin	et	al.		
6	Apr	2010	NJ	
Murder	(x4),	attempted	
murder	(x2),	felony	
murder	(x2),	kidnapping	
(x2),	burglary,	attempted	
arson,	weapons	offences	
4	life	terms	+	40‐
years	and	120‐
140‐years	parole	
ineligibility	
5	co‐accused	gang	
members,	2	raised	VCCR	
claims	
Baires	v	USA	
16	Apr	2010	VA	
Murder,	conspiracy	to	
commit	murder,	unlawful	
possession	and	illegal	use	
of	firearm	during	a	crime	
Life	 Gang	related	racketeering,	
illegal	aliens,	interpreters	
needed	
State	of	New	Mexico	v	
Peralta		
25	May	2010	NM	
Second	degree	murder,	
evidence	tampering,	
intimidation	of	witness		
Unspecified	 US	resident	for	16	years,	
interviewed	in	English	and	
Spanish	
State	of	Ohio	v	Alhajjeh		
8	Jul	2010	OH	
Murder,	felonious	assault,	
tampering	with	evidence	
20‐years	to	life Rights	conveyed	in	English	
and	Arabic,	not	guilty	plea	
changed	to	no	contest	
before	trial	
Argota	v	Miller		
25	Aug	2010	OK	
Attempted	murder 20‐years	+	
US$10,000	fine	
Work	visa,	severe	injuries	
to	victim	
State	of	New	Jersey	v	
Knight		
6	Jan	2011	NJ	
First	degree	aggravated	
manslaughter		
30‐years	 Extradition	from	Jamaica,	
English	language	
proficiency		
	
Two	involved	gang‐related	homicides	resulting	in	life	imprisonment	terms	with	no	possibility	for	
parole	for	each	co‐offender.	One	joint	appeal	by	six	Chinese	gang	members	contested	multiple	
felony‐murder,	 murder,	 kidnapping	 and	 attempted	 arson	 convictions,	 with	 two	 suspects	
unsuccessfully	raising	Article	36	violations	(State	of	New	Jersey	v	Lin,	Zhu,	Feng,	Lin,	Lau	and	Lin	
2010	NJ	Super	Unpub	LEXIS	699).	State	of	Ohio	v	Alhajjeh	(2010	Ohio	App	LEXIS	2660)	involved	
a	dual	Swedish	and	Jordanian	national	convicted	of	murdering	his	father‐in‐law	after	a	dispute	at	
the	 family’s	 business.	 In	Argota	v	Miller	 (2010	US	Dist	LEXIS	104767),	 a	Cuban	national	on	a	
temporary	 work	 visa	 was	 sentenced	 to	 20‐years’	 imprisonment	 and	 fined	 US$10,000	 for	
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attempted	murder	after	extensive	 trial	arguments	examined	his	 intention	during	 the	 incident.	
Another	case	involved	a	plea	agreement	and	notional	30‐year	imprisonment	term	to	avoid	trial	
for	first‐degree	murder	(State	of	New	Jersey	v	Knight,	2011	NJ	Super	Unpub	LEXIS	37).	
	
Table	2	documents	the	charges,	sentences	and	key	facts	in	ten	remaining	cases	in	this	sample.		
	
Table	2:	US	non‐homicide	cases	raising	Article	36,	January	2010‐July	2011	
Case,	date	and	
jurisdiction	
	
Offences	
	
Sentence	
	
Relevant	facts	
USA	v	Tull		
15	Jun	2010	NE	
Marijuana	possession	with	
intent	to	distribute	
6.5‐years	 20‐years	permanent	
resident	alien		
Castro‐Carlozama	v	
USA		
16	Jun	2010	NY	
Possession	and	intent	to	
distribute	over	1	kg	heroin	
10‐years Prior	convictions,	
interpreters	needed		
Martin	v	USA		
25	Aug	2010	IL	
Wire	fraud	 37‐months	+	5‐
yrs	supervised	
release		
Legal	resident	alien	facing	
deportation	
The	People	of	the	
Virgin	Islands	v	
Milosavljevic		
16	Sept	2010	VI	
Forgery,	obtaining	money	
by	false	pretences,	
embezzlement		
Awaiting	trial	 Temporary	work	visa	
Gordon	v	The	City	of	
New	York	Police	Dept	
84th	Precinct	et	al.	
15	Nov	2010	NY	
Unspecified	 Indeterminate	
term	of	2‐	to	6‐
years		
US3million	civil	rights	
damages	claimed	
Commonwealth	v	
Gautreaux		
20	Jan	2011	MA	
Three	prior	arrests	for	
Class	A	drug	possession,	
assault	and	battery	(x2),	
breach	of	protection	order,	
threats	to	offend;	
Rearrested	5‐years	later	
but	charges	dismissed	
11‐months	
suspended	for	
18‐months;	
Deportation	for	
subsequent	
arrest		
Moved	to	USA	aged	14;	
primary	language	Spanish;	
no	interpreter	at	plea	
hearing		
Lawal	v	USA		
4	Mar	2011	MD	
Possession	of	over	1kg	
heroin	with	intent	to	
distribute	
9‐years	+	5‐yrs	
supervised	
release		
2	co‐defendants		
USA	v	Jackson	
8	Mar	2011	TX	
Possession	of	41kg	
marijuana	with	intent	to	
distribute		
33‐months	+	3‐
yrs	supervised	
release	
3	co‐defendants,	resident	
alien	for	over	20	years	
USA	v	Pujols‐Tineo		
11	Mar	2011	RI	
Possession	of	over	500g	
cocaine	with	intent	to	
distribute		
18‐years Illegal	alien	deported	twice	
for	drug	and	violence	
convictions	
Quintero‐Hernandez	v	
USA		
15	Jun	2011	NC	
Illegal	re‐entry	of	deported	
alien	/aggravated	felon	
46‐months	+	3‐
yrs	supervised	
release		
Illegal	alien		
	
Six	(37.5%	of	the	16)	cases	involved	drug	‘possession’,	‘intent	to	distribute’,	‘conspiracy’	and	allied	
offences,	 with	 sentences	 ranging	 from	 an	 11‐month	 suspended	 imprisonment	 term	 and	
immediate	 deportation	 (Commonwealth	 v	 Gautreaux	 (2011)	 941	 NE2d	 616),	 to	 18‐years’	
imprisonment	imposed	on	a	Dominican	national	convicted	of	conspiracy	to	distribute	cocaine	and	
illegal	re‐entry	after	contravening	a	prior	deportation	order	(United	States	of	America	v	Pujols‐
Tineo	2011	US	Dist	LEXIS	25112).	One	case	involved	a	guilty	plea	for	a	single	count	of	wire	fraud	
resulting	in	a	37‐month	imprisonment	term	after	six	additional	charges	were	dismissed	(Martin	
v	United	States	of	America	2010	US	Dist	LEXIS	87706).	A	Serbian	national	temporarily	working	
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in	 the	Virgin	 Islands	 raised	 the	only	pre‐trial	Article	36	 claim	 in	 relation	 to	 several	 counts	of	
forgery,	obtaining	money	by	false	pretences	and	embezzlement	(People	of	the	Virgin	Islands	v	
Milosavljevic	2010	VI	LEXIS	65).	Only	one	case	involved	a	Mexican	national,	who	unsuccessfully	
used	Article	 36	 to	 challenge	 convictions	 for	 aggravated	 felony	 and	 illegal	 re‐entry	 (Quintero‐
Hernandez	v	United	States	of	America	2011	US	Dist	LEXIS	63469).	Finally,	Gordon	v	The	City	of	
New	 York	 Police	 Department	 84th	 Precinct	 et	 al.	 (2010	 US	 Dist	 LEXIS	 122200)	 involved	 an	
unsuccessful	claim	for	civil	rights	damages	against	multiple	federal	and	state	agencies	by	a	foreign	
national	subjected	to	indeterminate	detention	before	his	deportation	for	unspecified	offences.		
	
Table	 3	 documents	 the	 nationality	 of	 the	 foreign	 suspect	 and	 the	 time	 the	 alleged	Article	 36	
violation	was	recorded,	where	each	was	discernible.		
	
Table	3.	US	Article	36	claims,	January	2010‐July	2011,	by	country	of	citizenship	and	timing	
of	notification	
Offence	
type	
	
Case	name	and	date	
	
Nationality		
	
Timing	of	Article	36	notification	
Non‐
capital	
Homicide	
State	of	New	Jersey	v	Lin	et	
al.	6	Apr	2010	
China Post‐conviction	after	initial	appeal	
Baires	v	USA	
16	Apr	2010	
El	Salvador Consulate	contacted	two‐months	after	
arrest	and	eight‐months	before	trial		
State	of	New	Mexico	v	
Peralta	25	May	2010	
Honduras Unspecified	pre‐trial	
State	of	Ohio	v	Alhajjeh	
8	Jul	2010	
Sweden	and	
Jordan		
Unspecified	post‐conviction	claim;	
notified	at	arraignment;	argued	
statements	wrongfully	admitted	at	trial	
Argota	v	Miller		
25	Aug	2010	
Cuba Unspecified	post‐conviction	claim	
State	of	New	Jersey	v	Knight	
6	Jan	2011	
Jamaica Arraignment	
Drugs	 USA	v	Tull		
15	Jun	2010	
Guyana Post‐conviction	after	initial	appeal	
Castro‐Carlozama	v	USA
16	Jun	2010	
Colombia Unspecified	post‐conviction	claim	
Commonwealth	v	Gautreaux	
20	Jan	2011	
Dominican	
Republic	
Unspecified	post‐conviction	claim	for	
retrial	
Lawal	v	USA		
4	Mar	2011	
Ghana Unspecified	post‐conviction	claim	
USA	v	Jackson		
8	Mar	2011	
Jamaica One‐day	after	arrest	at	initial	court	
appearance	before	counsel	appointed		
USA	v	Pujols‐Tineo		
11	Mar	2011	
Dominican	
Republic	
Accused’s	request	to	police	and	counsel	
denied	
Fraud	 Martin	v	USA		
25	Aug	2010	
Sierra	Leone Unspecified	post‐conviction	claim;	Art	
36	not	raised	at	trial	or	first	appeal	
	 The	People	of	the	Virgin	
Islands	v	Milosavljevic		
16	Sept	2010	
Serbia Consulate	contacted	by	friend	three‐
days	after	arrest		
Illegal	
Re‐entry	
Quintero‐Hernandez	v	USA	
15	Jun	2011	
Mexico Unspecified	post‐conviction	claim;	
suspect	unaware	of	VCCR	before	trial	
Not	
specified	
Gordon	v	The	City	of	New	
York	Police	Department	
84th	Precinct	et	al.		
15	Nov	2010	
Trinidad	&	
Tobago	
Accused’s	request	to	police	at	time	of	
arrest	denied		
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The	majority	of	foreign	suspects	in	this	sample	were	from	Central	or	South	America	(56.25%)	
where	Spanish	 (66.7%)	or	English	 (33.3%)	are	 recognised	national	 languages.	Two	European	
claimants	 held	 Serbian	 and	 dual	 Swedish‐Jordanian	 citizenship	 respectively.	 Aside	 from	 the	
Chinese	 gang,	 two	 cases	 involved	West	African	nationals	 from	countries	where	English	 is	 the	
recognised	 language.	This	 relative	balance	between	English	 and	non‐English	 speaking	 foreign	
nationals	has	broader	impacts	on	political	comity,	especially	given	the	Southern	criminological	
dimensions	of	US	extraterritorial	drug	enforcement	activity	(Carrington,	Hogg	and	Sozzo	2016;	
Warren	and	Palmer	2015:	233‐289).	As	with	most	capital	cases	(Shiek	2006),	foreign	nationals	in	
this	sample	generally	became	aware	of	Article	36	after	conviction,	with	only	two	cases	involving	
requests	for	consular	assistance	that	were	subsequently	denied	by	police.	However,	case	records	
are	also	vague	on	the	timing	of	most	alleged	Article	36	violations,	which	reflects	the	permeation	
of	the	jurisdictional	issues	examined	by	the	ICJ	and	the	US	Supreme	Court	into	post‐conviction	
state	appeal	courts.		
	
Each	case	considers	whether	a	lack	of	consular	notification	is	sufficient	to	justify	a	judicial	remedy	
given	 the	 suspect’s	 language	 skills	 and	 personal	 vulnerabilities	 (Rogoff	 2006).	 The	 following	
documents	how	these	contextual	issues	are	bracketed	alongside	four	intersecting	aspects	of	the	
broader	jurisdictional	dialogue	between	the	ICJ	and	the	US	Supreme	Court	(Howell	2013)	to	limit	
the	prospect	of	judicial	intervention	in	these	non‐capital	post‐conviction	appeals.		
	
The	‘right’	to	consular	notification	
Claims	an	Article	36	violation	results	in	substantial	prejudice	are	commonly	rejected	as	US	federal	
legislation	and	‘the	Constitution	does	not	guarantee	any	right	to	consular	access	or	assistance’	
(Argota	v	Miller	2010	US	Dist	LEXIS	104767:	44).	State	courts	often	refer	to	the	language	of	Article	
36	 and	 established	 federal	 or	 state	 precedents	 to	 conclude	 ‘the	 Convention	 does	 not	 create	
individually	enforceable	rights’	(Argota	v	Miller	2010	US	Dist	LEXIS	104767:	44;	People	of	the	
Virgin	Islands	v	Milosavljevic	2010	VI	LEXIS	65	paras	5‐7;	United	States	of	America	v	 Jackson	
2011	US	Dist	LEXIS	2377:	13),	but	does	place	a	‘responsibility	for	notification	and	advisement	on	
“the	 competent	 authorities”	 of	 the	 jurisdiction	 in	 which	 the	 person	 is	 arrested	 or	 detained’	
(People	of	the	Virgin	Islands	v	Milosavljevic	2010	VI	LEXIS	65	para	10).	While	post‐conviction	
review	claims	seeking	remedies	for	an	Article	36	violation	are	given	‘respectful	consideration’,	
they	have	no	recognised	legal	basis	unless	general	principles	of	fairness	were	compromised,	as	‘a	
decision	 of	 the	 ICJ	 is	 not	 binding’	 (Commonwealth	 v	 Gautreaux	 (2011)	 941	NE2d	 616:	 625).	
Further,	if	Article	36	is	not	raised	during	pre‐trial	or	trial	arguments,	it	is	‘procedurally	barred	
from	consideration’	on	appeal	(United	States	of	America	v	Jackson	2011	US	Dist	LEXIS	2377:	5).		
	
State	review	courts	openly	question	the	accuracy	of	claims	police	failed	to	communicate	the	right	
to	consular	assistance,	or	that	such	failures	prejudiced	the	final	verdict	(Lawal	v	United	States	of	
America	2011	US	Dist	LEXIS	22214).	An	appeal	by	a	Jamaican	national	convicted	of	possessing	41	
kilograms	of	marijuana	with	 intent	 to	 distribute,	 demonstrates	 the	 onus	 for	 seeking	 consular	
assistance	rests	primarily	with	the	foreign	national,	and	legal	remedies	are	unavailable	if	the	right	
to	consular	notification	is	not	recognised	under	federal	or	state	law.	This	case	brackets	Article	36	
as	a	non‐binding	choice	police,	legal	counsel	or	arraignment	courts	can	convey	at	their	discretion,	
or	foreign	nationals	can	request	but	not	positively	assert.	Hence:	
	
[i]f	Jackson	was	truly	interested	in	assistance	from	the	Jamaican	consul,	nothing	
prohibited	Jackson	from	writing	to	the	consulate	or	asking	his	trial	counsel	to	do	
so.	(United	States	of	America	v	Jackson	2011	US	Dist	LEXIS	2377:	11)	
	
There	is	also	no	guarantee	consular	assistance	would	be	useful	in	navigating	the	complexities	of	
the	 US	 criminal	 justice	 process.	 Rather,	 notification	 is	 bracketed	 as	 a	 discretionary	 choice	
enabling	the	consulate	to	determine	whether	assistance	should	be	provided	if	a	request	is	made	
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by	police,	other	justice	officials,	or	the	foreign	suspect.	Thus,	in	United	States	of	America	v	Pujols‐
Tineo:	
	
[t]he	El	Salvadoran	Consulate	was	notified	of	petitioner’s	arrest	eight	months	prior	
to	petitioner’s	trial,	more	than	ample	time	…	to	provide	investigative,	translative,	
or	other	pretrial	assistance	had	it	chosen	to	do	so.	Yet,	this	record	reflects	that	no	
efforts	were	undertaken	by	the	El	Salvadoran	government	to	communicate	with	
petitioner	or	assist	him	in	any	way.	(United	States	of	America	v	Pujols‐Tineo	2011	
US	Dist	LEXIS	25112:	17)	
	
State	courts	deny	individually	enforceable	status	to	Article	36	by	affirming	that	‘rights	under	the	
Vienna	Convention	are	not	the	equivalent	of	constitutional	rights	…	and	need	not	be	explained	at	
the	time	of	arraignment’	(State	of	Ohio	v	Alhajjeh	2010	Ohio	App	LEXIS	2660	para	18).	Therefore,	
any	potential	remedies,	such	as	the	exclusion	of	prejudicial	evidence,	must	conform	to	recognised	
domestic	laws,	which	involve	speculative	assessments	of	how	third‐party	assistance	might	have	
changed	a	trial	outcome	by	altering	the	focus	of	an	investigation,	a	suspect’s	plea,	or	counsel’s	
legal	arguments.		
	
Procedural	default	and	ineffective	counsel	
The	 ‘procedural	 default’	 rule	 prevents	 continuous	post‐conviction	 appeals	when	new	 facts	 or	
legal	issues	emerge.	The	ICJ	has	criticised	the	circular	effects	of	this	requirement,	as	many	foreign	
nationals	and	consulates	only	become	aware	of	an	Article	36	violation	after	conviction	 (Shiek	
2006).	This	means:	‘…	the	defendant	is	effectively	barred	from	raising	the	issue	of	the	violation	of	
his	[sic]	rights	under	Article	36	…	and	is	limited	to	seeking	the	vindication	of	his	rights	under	the	
United	States	Constitution’	(Mexico	v	United	States	2004:	63).	
	
Our	 sample	 indicates	 post‐conviction	 review	 courts	 readily	 question	 attempts	 ‘to	 get	 around’	
procedural	default	by	claiming	‘counsel	was	ineffective’	for	not	raising	the	prejudicial	impacts	of	
an	Article	36	violation	during	the	trial	or	previous	appeals	(Martin	v	United	States	of	America	
2010	 US	 Dist	 LEXIS	 87706:	 19).	 These	 arguments	 routinely	 fail	 because	 Article	 36	 is	 not	
considered	 an	 independently	 enforceable	 legal	 right,	 and	 it	 is	 virtually	 impossible	 to	 prove	
consular	assistance	would	have	led	to	alternate	legal	strategies	or	altered	the	trial	outcome	had	
counsel	been	more	vigilant	(United	States	of	America	v	Pujols‐Tineo	2011	US	Dist	LEXIS	25112).	
	
For	example,	a	Sierra	Leonean	national	convicted	of	wire	fraud	could	only	provide	a	‘conclusory	
assertion	that	his	counsel	was	 ineffective	 for	 failing	to	notify	him	of	his	Article	36	rights’,	and	
offered	 no	 ‘credible	 indication	 of	 facts	 reasonably	 available	 to	 him	 to	 …	 establish	 prejudice’	
(Martin	 v	United	 States	 of	 America	 2010	US	Dist	 LEXIS	87706:	 19‐20).	 Similarly,	 a	 Guyanese	
national	with	20‐years’	residency	in	the	US	could	not	substantiate	‘the	highly	dubious	proposition	
that	 counsel’s	 performance	 was	 deficient’	 by	 ‘amorphously’	 asserting	 it	 deprived	 him	 of	 an	
essential	‘[c]ultural	bridge’	for	negotiating	the	US	‘legal	machinery’	(United	States	of	America	v	
Tull	2010	US	Dist	LEXIS	59436:	2;	5).	Finally,	a	Cuban	national	convicted	and	sentenced	to	20‐
years’	imprisonment	for	attempted	murder	could	not	prove	he	‘would	have	availed	himself	of	his	
right	to	seek	consular	assistance	had	he	known	of	that	right’,	or	that:		
	
the	Cuban	consulate	would	have	rendered	such	assistance	or	that	any	assistance	
rendered	would	have	 affected	 the	 trial	 outcome	 in	Petitioner’s	 favor.	 (Argota	 v	
Miller	2010	US	Dist	LEXIS	104767:	33‐34)		
	
Excluding	evidence	
Evidence	can	be	excluded	if	police	questioning	or	the	conduct	of	an	investigation	involved	clear	
procedural	anomalies.	However,	‘a	violation	of	the	Vienna	Convention	does	not	normally	warrant	
the	remedy	of	suppression’	(United	States	of	America	v	Tull	2010	US	Dist	LEXIS	59436:	8),	with	
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statements	made	in	absence	of	a	consular	representative	automatically	deemed	admissible	unless	
general	rules	justify	their	exclusion	during	pre‐trial	evidentiary	hearings	(State	v	Peralta	2010	
NM	App	Unpub	LEXIS	232),	or	on	appeal.	In	contrast	to	the	Australian	Anunga	guidelines,	specific	
procedural	 protections	 for	 certain	 populations,	 including	 foreign	 nationals,	 are	 not	 usually	
recognised	 under	 US	 law.	 Therefore,	 a	 Honduran	 national	 appealing	 convictions	 for	 second‐
degree	murder	 and	witness	 tampering	 could	not	 cite	 precedents	 suggesting	 foreign	nationals	
were	more	likely	to	make	involuntary	or	prejudicial	statements	to	police	than	any	other	class	of	
vulnerable	suspect	(State	v	Peralta	2010	NM	App	Unpub	LEXIS	232:	6).	Similarly,	in	reviewing	
the	 convictions	 of	 a	Dominican	 citizen	who	had	 lived	 in	 the	US	 for	nine	 years	but	had	 ‘never	
become	fluent	 in	English’	(Commonwealth	v	Gautreaux	(2011)	941	NE2d	616:	618),	the	court	
concluded:	
	
[f]oreign	nationals	arrested	and	detained	in	the	United	States	are	provided	with	
the	 same	 constitutional	 protections	 as	 United	 States	 citizens,	 including,	 in	 the	
defendant’s	circumstances,	the	right	to	the	prompt	appointment	of	an	attorney	to	
represent	him	throughout	the	proceedings.	(Commonwealth	v	Gautreaux	(2011)	
941	NE2d	616:	626)	
	
These	rulings	extend	to	Miranda	waivers,	which	are	commonly	offered	to	suspects	before	police	
questioning.	Thus,	a	Jamaican	national	appealing	a	manslaughter	conviction	could	not	prove	he	
‘would	not	have	 signed	 those	 forms	or	 given	his	 statement	 if	 he	had	been	 informed	he	 could	
contact	the	Jamaican	consulate’	(State	of	New	Jersey	v	Knight	2011	NJ	Super	Unpub	LEXIS	37:	6)	
after	 he	 was	 initially	 apprehended	 by	 Jamaican	 authorities	 and	 waived	 the	 right	 to	 contest	
extradition	 to	 the	 US.	 An	 arraignment	 judge	 later	 informed	 Knight	 he	 could	 seek	 consular	
assistance,	but	post‐conviction	review	found	he	had	‘not	established	that	he	was	prejudiced’	or	
needed	‘consular	assistance	to	understand	the	English	language’	(State	of	New	Jersey	v	Knight	
2011	NJ	Super	Unpub	LEXIS	37:	6‐7).	This	case	clearly	invokes	Article	36	to	test	whether	state	
courts	are	willing	to	contradict	the	Supreme	Court	by	recognising	a	protective	right	to	consular	
assistance	in	non‐capital	cases.	
	
Similarly,	 in	 State	 of	Ohio	 v	Alhajjeh	 (2010	Ohio	App	 LEXIS	 2660),	 a	 dual	 Swedish‐Jordanian	
national	 sought	 to	 review	 the	 effect	 of	 a	 waiver	 signed	 without	 the	 presence	 of	 a	 Jordanian	
consular	 official.	While	Alhajjeh	 claimed	his	 statements	were	 involuntary,	 the	 court	 found	no	
discernible	‘language	barrier	impeded’	his	comprehension	of	the	waiver	(State	of	Ohio	v	Alhajjeh,	
2010	Ohio	App	LEXIS	2660	para	50).	Alhajjeh	also	spoke	English	as	a	child	and	Cleveland	Police	
provided	an	Arabic	 interpreter	 at	 various	points	during	 the	 interview,	 including	 the	 time	 the	
Miranda	waiver	was	voluntarily	signed.		
	
Establishing	prejudice		
Claims	 the	 applicant	 ‘need	 not	 show	 prejudice’	 or	 substantial	 disadvantage	 for	 an	 Article	 36	
violation	are	commonly	rejected	(People	of	the	Virgin	Islands	v	Milosavljevic	2010	VI	LEXIS	65	
para	12),	as	this	provision	‘merely	provides	for	consular	notification	of	a	foreign	national’s	arrest;	
it	 does	 not	 guarantee	 intervention	 by	 the	 consulate’	 (Quintero‐Hernandez	 v	 United	 States	 of	
America	 2011	 US	 Dist	 LEXIS	 63469:	 4).	 Actual	 prejudice	 is	 only	 established	 with	 proof	 that	
consular	notification	would	have	altered	a	‘guilty	plea’	(Quintero‐Hernandez	v	United	States	of	
America	 2011	US	Dist	 LEXIS	63469:	 4),	 or	when:	 ‘…	 concrete	 areas	 in	which	 assistance	 from	
consular	officials,	even	assuming	it	had	been	forthcoming,	might	have	significantly	affected	the	
manner	in	which	his	defense	was	conducted’	(Castro‐Carlozama	v	United	States	of	America	2010	
US	 Dist	 LEXIS	 80458:	 11).	 There	 is	 no	 prejudice	 if	 police	 deny	 a	 request	 for	 assistance	 or	
notification	 is	 delayed	 for	 several	months	 after	 arrest,	 as	 there	 is	 no	 guarantee	 the	 consulate	
would	have	‘responded,	offered	assistance,	or	opposed	petitioner’s	continued	detention’,	or	that	
any	advice	would	have	changed	the	trial	outcome	(Baires	v	United	States	of	America	(2010)	707	
F	 Supp	 2d	 656:	 664).	 This	 reasoning	 also	 extends	 to	 decisions	 involving	 the	 post‐conviction	
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deportation	of	a	foreign	national.	Thus,	in	Gordon	v	The	City	of	New	York	Police	Department	84th	
Precinct	et	al.	(2010	US	Dist	LEXIS	122200:	4),	there	was	no	evidence	supporting	‘a	civil	rights	
action	for	[US$3	million]	damages	either	directly	under	the	Convention’	or	US	law	after	New	York	
municipal	 police	 and	 agents	 for	 the	Departments	 of	Homeland	 Security	 and	 Immigration	 and	
Customs	 Enforcement	 denied	 a	 foreign	 suspect’s	 request	 for	 consular	 assistance.	 Without	
additional	proof,	claims	that	‘consular	officials	would	have	helped’	a	foreign	suspect	to	‘navigate	
the	US	 legal	 system	 and	overcome	 language	difficulties’	 (Castro‐Carlozama	v	United	 States	 of	
America	2010	US	Dist	LEXIS	80458:	9‐10)	are	mere	assertions	that	do	not	justify	a	formal	remedy	
in	absence	of	specific	federal	or	state	legislation	to	the	contrary.	
	
Conclusion	
Article	36	of	 the	VCCR	recognises	 foreign	nationals	can	experience	disadvantage	 in	unfamiliar	
justice	systems.	Our	Southern	criminological	approach	uses	a	defendant‐centred	perspective	to	
examine	 how	 the	 impact	 of	 consular	 notification	 is	 often	 ‘placed	 outside	 of	 law’,	 yet	
simultaneously	remains	a	central	‘product	of	law’	(Blomley	2014:	136).	For	example,	Australian	
case	law	examines	the	nature	of	police	cautioning	to	determine	the	admissibility	of	evidence,	but	
only	the	New	Zealand	case	of	Bin	Zhang	considers	the	limited	value	of	consular	notification	in	
fleeting	forms	of	police	detention.	In	direct	contrast,	the	US	jurisdictional	schism	between	the	ICJ	
and	US	federal	and	state	courts	(Berman	2012)	overlooks	the	immediate	‘[s]patial	particularities’	
of	police	encounters	with	foreign	nationals	entirely,	which	are	‘erased	in	pursuit	of	a	universal	
space	of	equality’	(Blomley	2014:	137)	under	generic	legal	requirements	applicable	to	all	people.	
This	 form	of	 legal	 bracketing	places	 an	 almost	 impossible	 onus	on	 foreign	nationals	 to	prove	
consular	assistance	would	have	altered	the	investigative	focus,	legal	arguments	or	trial	outcome.	
	
The	concept	of	the	‘prisoner’s	friend’	under	Australia’s	Anunga	guidelines	is	a	useful	example	of	
Southern	 procedural	 law	 that	 reflects	 the	 pastoral	 value	 of	 third‐party	 assistance.	 Our	
preliminary	 study	 suggests	 that	 linguistic	 competence	does	not	necessarily	 equate	with	a	 full	
understanding	of	foreign	policing	or	justice	procedures.	However,	available	remedies	are	limited	
regardless	of	whether	consular	notification	is	bracketed	as	a	procedural	or	jurisdictional	issue.	
For	example,	Australian	crimmigration	strategies	are	gradually	eroding	admissibility	standards	
to	 facilitate	 immediate	 forms	 of	 evidence	 collection	 regardless	 of	 the	 context	 of	 the	 police	
encounter	or	the	foreign	suspect’s	wellbeing.	This	is	also	evident	in	our	US	sample:	there	are	no	
specific	remedies	for	alleged	contraventions	of	an	international	obligation	and	the	US	Supreme	
Court	 is	 unwilling	 to	 formally	 recognise	 pending	 state	 or	 federal	 congressional	 action.	 These	
issues	become	more	salient	when	the	spatial	and	temporal	dynamics	of	police	encounters	with	
foreign	nationals	are	emphasised	in	the	critical	examination	of	judicial	decision‐making	(Blomley	
2014;	Valverde	2015).	We	suggest	this	defendant‐centred	emphasis	is	crucial	to	the	development	
of	a	Southern	criminology	of	law	that	recognises	the	complex	and	diverse	ways	international	legal	
requirements	 can	 be	 incorporated	 into	 domestic	 policing,	 pre‐trial	 and	 post‐conviction	
accountability	mechanisms	available	to	foreign	nationals	suspected	of,	or	victimised,	by	crime.		
	
	
	
Correspondence:	 Sally	 Kennedy,	 Doctoral	 Candidate,	 Faculty	 of	 Arts	 and	 Education,	 School	 of	
Humanities	and	Social	Sciences,	Geelong	Waurn	Ponds	Campus,	Deakin	University,	75	Pigdons	
Road,	Waurn	Ponds	3216	Victoria,	Australia.	Email:	s.kennedy@deakin.edu.au	
	
	
References	
Andreas	P	and	Nadelmann	E	(2006)	Policing	the	Globe:	Criminalisation	and	Crime	Control	in	
International	Relations.	New	York:	Oxford	University	Press.	
Sally	Kennedy,	Ian	Warren:	Southern	Criminology,	Law	and	the	‘Right’	to	Consular	Notification	in	Australia,	NZ	and	the	US	
	
IJCJ&SD									112	
Online	version	via	www.crimejusticejournal.com	 	 ©	2018	7(4)	
Australian	Government,	Department	of	Home	Affairs	(2017)	Work	in	Australia	‐	Statistics.	
Available	at	https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/about/reports‐publications/research‐
statistics/statistics/work‐in‐australia	(accessed	24	January	2018).		
Bartels	L	(2011)	Police	interviews	with	vulnerable	adult	suspects.	Research	in	Practice,	No.	21.	
Canberra,	Australian	Capital	Territory:	Australian	Institute	of	Criminology.		
Berman	PS	(2012)	Global	Legal	Pluralism:	A	Jurisprudence	of	Law	beyond	Borders.	Cambridge,	
England:	Cambridge	University	Press.	
Blomley	N	(2014)	Disentangling	law:	The	practice	of	legal	bracketing.	Annual	Review	of	Law	and	
Social	Science	10:	133‐148.	DOI:	10.1146/annurev‐lawsocsci‐110413‐030719.	
Boister	N	(2015)	Further	reflections	on	the	concept	of	transnational	criminal	law.	Transnational	
Legal	Theory	6(1):	9‐30.	DOI:	10.1080/20414005.2015.1042232.	
Bosworth	M	and	Kaufman	E	(2011)	Foreigners	in	a	carceral	age:	Immigration	and	
imprisonment	in	the	United	States.	Stanford	Law	and	Policy	Review	22(2):	429‐454.	
Bowling	B	and	Sheptycki	J	(2015)	Global	policing	and	transnational	rule	with	law.	Transnational	
Legal	Theory	6(1):	141‐173.	DOI:	10.1080/20414005.2015.1042235.	
Broughton	JR	(2012)	Federalism,	harm,	and	the	politics	of	Garcia	v	Texas.	Syracuse	Law	Review	
62(2):	199‐207.	
Buys	CG,	Pollock	SD	and	Pellicer	IN	(2011)	Do	unto	others:	The	importance	of	better	compliance	
with	consular	notification	rights.	Duke	Journal	of	Comparative	and	International	Law	21(3):	
461‐501.	
Carrington	K,	Hogg	R	and	Sozzo	M	(2016)	Southern	criminology.	British	Journal	of	Criminology	
56(1):	1‐20.	DOI:	10.1093/bjc/azv083.	
Department	of	Foreign	Affairs	and	Trade	(n.d.)	Foreign	embassies	and	consulates	in	Australia.	
Available	at	http://protocol.dfat.gov.au/Consulate/list.rails	(accessed	24	January	2018).	
Dorsett	S	and	McVeigh	S	(2012)	Jurisdiction.	Abingdon,	England:	Routledge.	
Douglas	H	(1998)	The	cultural	specificity	of	evidence:	The	current	scope	and	relevance	of	the	
Anunga	guidelines.	UNSW	Law	Journal	21(1):	27‐54.	
Dunworth	T	(2011)	The	influence	of	international	law	in	New	Zealand:	Some	reflections.	In	
Morris	C,	Boston	J	and	Butler	P	(eds)	Reconstituting	the	Constitution:	319‐335.	Berlin:	
Springer‐Verlag.	
Garland	D	(2013)	Penality	and	the	penal	state.	Criminology	51(3):	475‐517.	DOI:	10.1111/1745‐
9125.12015.	
Gless	S	(2015)	Bird’s‐eye	view	and	worm’s	eye	view:	Towards	a	defendant‐based	approach	in	
transnational	criminal	law.	Transnational	Legal	Theory	6(1):	117‐140.	DOI:	
10.1080/20414005.2015.1042233.	
Gray	A	(2013)	Constitutionally	heeding	the	right	to	silence	in	Australia.	Monash	University	Law	
Review	39(1):	156‐180.	
Howell	NM	(2013)	A	proposal	for	US	implementation	of	the	Vienna	Convention’s	consular	
notification	requirement.	UCLA	Law	Review	60(5):	1326‐1381.	
James	S	and	Warren	I	(2010)	Australian	police	responses	to	transnational	crime.	In	Eterno	JA	
and	Das	DK	(eds)	Police	Practices	in	Global	Perspective:	131‐172.	Lanham,	Maryland:	
Rowman	and	Littlefield.	
Klein	N	(2011)	David	Hicks,	Stern	Hu,	Scott	Rush,	Jock	Palfreeman	and	the	legal	parameters	of	
Australia’s	protection	of	its	citizens	abroad.	Melbourne	University	Law	Review	35(1):	134‐
164.	
Lavander	T	(2014)	Using	the	Julian	Assange	dispute	to	address	international	law’s	failure	to	
address	the	right	of	diplomatic	asylum.	Brooklyn	Journal	of	International	Law	39(1):	443‐486.	
Lee	LT	and	Quigley	J	(2008)	Consular	Law	and	Practice,	3rd	edn.	Oxford,	England:	Oxford	
University	Press.	
Sally	Kennedy,	Ian	Warren:	Southern	Criminology,	Law	and	the	‘Right’	to	Consular	Notification	in	Australia,	NZ	and	the	US	
	
IJCJ&SD									113	
Online	version	via	www.crimejusticejournal.com	 	 ©	2018	7(4)	
Loader	I	and	Percy	S	(2012)	Bringing	the	‘outside’	in	and	the	‘inside’	out:	Crossing	the	
criminology/IR	divide.	Global	Crime	13(4):	213‐218.	DOI:	10.1080/17440572.2012.715402.	
Mallory	C	(2016)	Abolitionists	at	home	and	abroad:	A	right	to	consular	assistance	and	the	death	
penalty.	Melbourne	Journal	of	International	Law	17(1):	51‐82.	
Moss	N	(2012)	Don’t	mess	with	Texas:	Garcia	v.	Texas	and	the	Supreme	Court’s	inversion	of	the	
supremacy	clause.	Loyola	University	of	Chicago	International	Law	Review	9(2):	347‐369.	
New	South	Wales	Police	Force	(n.d.)	Caution	and	Summary	of	Part	9	of	the	Law	Enforcement	
(Powers	&	Responsibilities)	Act	2002.	Available	at	
http://www.idrs.org.au/education/getting‐arrested‐kit‐
resources/4_cautionAndSummary_part9LEPRA.pdf	(accessed	14	October	2016).	
New	Zealand	Law	Commission	(1994)	Police	Questioning.	Wellington,	New	Zealand:	The	Law	
Commission.		
Queensland	Police	(2016)	Operational	Procedures	Manual.	Queensland	Government.		
Quigley	J,	Aceves	WJ	and	Shank	A	(2010)	The	Law	of	Consular	Access:	A	Documentary	Guide.	
Milton	Park	and	New	York:	Routledge.	
Rogoff	MA	(2006)	Application	of	treaties	and	the	decisions	of	international	tribunals	in	the	
United	States	and	France:	Reflections	on	recent	practice.	Maine	Law	Review	58(2):	406‐471.	
Shiek	M	(2006)	From	Breard	to	Medellin:	Supreme	Court	inaction	or	ICJ	activism	in	the	field	of	
international	law?	California	Law	Review	94(2):	531‐573.	
Stransky	SG	(2007)	Sanchez‐Llamas	v	Oregon:	A	missed	opportunity	in	treaty	interpretation.	St	
Thomas	Law	Review	20(1):	25‐68.	
Tourism	Australia	(2017)	International	visitor	arrivals.	Tourism	Statistics.	Available	at	
http://www.tourism.australia.com/en/markets‐and‐research/tourism‐
statistics/international‐visitor‐arrivals.html	(accessed	24	January	2018).	
United	Nations	Treaty	Collection	(2016)	Chapter	III.	Privileges	and	immunities,	diplomatic	and	
consular	relations,	etc.	Status	Report.	Available	at	
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=III‐
6&chapter=3&clang=_en#10	(accessed	12	November	2016).		
Valverde	M	(2015)	Chronotopes	of	Law:	Jurisdiction,	Scale	and	Governance.	Abingdon,	England:	
Routledge.	
Venditto	J	and	Mouzos	J	(2006)	The	murder	of	overseas	visitors	to	Australia.	Trends	&	Issues	in	
Crime	and	Criminal	Justice	316.	Canberra,	Australian	Capital	Territory:	Australian	Institute	of	
Criminology.	
Warren	I	and	Palmer	D	(2015)	Global	Criminology.	Sydney,	New	South	Wales:	Law	Book	
Company/Thomson	Reuters.	
Warren	I	and	Palmer	D	(2018)	Southern	criminology,	zonal	banning	and	the	language	of	urban	
crime	prevention.	In	Carrington	K,	Hogg	R,	Scott	J	and	Sozzo	M	(eds)	The	Palgrave	Handbook	
of	Criminology	and	the	Global	South:	183‐201.	Cham,	Switzerland:	Palgrave.		
Wojcik	ME	(2013)	Consular	notification	for	dual	nationals.	Southern	Illinois	University	Law	
Journal	38(1):	73‐92.	
	
Treaties	cited	
United	Nations	(1963:2005)	Vienna	Convention	on	Consular	Relations.	Available	at	
http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_2_1963.pdf	(accessed	6	
October	2016).	
	
Legislation	cited	
Bill	of	Rights	Act	1990	(NZ).	
Crimes	Act	1914	(Cth).		
Sally	Kennedy,	Ian	Warren:	Southern	Criminology,	Law	and	the	‘Right’	to	Consular	Notification	in	Australia,	NZ	and	the	US	
	
IJCJ&SD									114	
Online	version	via	www.crimejusticejournal.com	 	 ©	2018	7(4)	
Crimes	Act	1958	(Vic).	
Criminal	Investigation	Act	2006	(WA).	
Law	Enforcement	(Powers	and	Responsibilities)	Act	2002	(NSW).	
Police	Powers	and	Responsibilities	Act	2000	(Qld).	
	
Cases	cited		
Ade	Sutiawan	Bin	Sulaeman	v	R	[2013]	NSWCCA	283	(14	November	2013).	
Argota	v	Miller	(2010)	US	Dist	LEXIS	104767	(25	August	2010).	
Baires	v	United	States	of	America	[2010]	707	F	Supp	2d	656	(16	April	2010).	
Bin	Zhang	v	Police	[2009]	NZAR	217	(25	January	2008).	
Castro‐Carlozama	v	United	States	of	America	(2010)	US	Dist	LEXIS	80458	(16	June	2010).	
Commonwealth	v	Gautreaux	[2011]	941	NE2d	616	(20	January	2011).	
Foo	v	The	Queen	[2001]	NTCCA	2	(6	June	2001).	
Garcia	v	Texas	[2011]	131	S	Ct	2866	(7	July	2011).	
Gordon	v	The	City	of	New	York	Police	Department	84th	Precinct;	Shield;	US	Department	of	
Homeland	Security;	Immigration	and	Customs	Enforcement;	Agent	Boyce	T	and	Agent	Santiago	
E	(2010)	US	Dist	LEXIS	122200	(15	November	2010).	
Lawal	v	United	States	of	America	(2011)	US	Dist	LEXIS	22214	(4	March	2011).	
Martin	v	United	States	of	America	(2010)	US	Dist	LEXIS	87706	(25	August	2010).	
Mexico	v	United	States	of	America	(Avena	and	Other	Mexican	Nationals)	(Judgment)	[2004]	
International	Court	of	Justice	(31	March	2004).		
People	of	the	Virgin	Islands	v	Milosavljevic	(2010)	VI	LEXIS	65	(16	September	2010).	
Quintero‐Hernandez	v	United	States	of	America	(2011)	US	Dist	LEXIS	63469	(15	June	2011).	
R	v	Anunga	and	others;	R	v	Wheeler	and	others	(1976)	11	ALR	412	(30	April	1976).	
R	v	Kok	Cheng	Tan	[2001]	WASC	275	(5	October	2001).	
R	v	Su	[1997]	1	VR	1	(15	December	1995).	
R	v	Swaffield;	Pavic	v	R	[1998]	192	CLR	159	(20	January	1998).	
State	v	Peralta	(2010)	NM	App	Unpub	LEXIS	232	(25	May	2010).	
State	of	New	Jersey	v	Knight	(2011)	NJ	Super	Unpub	LEXIS	37	(6	January	2011).	
State	of	New	Jersey	v	Lin,	Zhu,	Feng,	Lin,	Lau	and	Lin	(2010)	NJ	Super	Unpub	LEXIS	699	(6	April	
2010).	
State	of	Ohio	v	Alhajjeh	(2010)	Ohio	App	LEXIS	2660	(8	July	2010).	
Tang	Seng	Kiah	v	R	[2001]	NTCCA	1	(8	March	2001).	
United	States	of	America	v	Jackson	(2011)	US	Dist	LEXIS	2377	(8	March	2011).	
United	States	of	America	v	Pujols‐Tineo	(2011)	US	Dist	LEXIS	25112	(11	March	2011).	
United	States	of	America	v	Tull	(2010)	US	Dist	LEXIS	59436	(15	June	2010).	
	
